開啓一個新的版, 這是個有趣的問題, 應該可以聚焦一陣子的 (到球季結束), 動機來自過去讀到的幾篇文章和本季這裡頗受觀注的七六人, 第一篇重要內文摘要如下:

Acting like a bad team

Here's where tanking gets really crazy: When teams with really smart front offices are forced to mimic teams with really bad front offices.

"The process of rebuilding is extremely rough on everyone," says Raptors GM Bryan Colangelo, "and unfortunately made worse by the reality that the whole system is counterintuitive. Strangely, losing may help you eventually win. But players, coaches and management are all in this place trained as competitors. How in the world do you tell a player or coach to go out there and lay down? The answer is you don’t. But I continually stress that even in defeat we must win in other ways with the intent of moving the dial forward."

In other words, build with talent, build with coaching, build with culture and build with the long-term benefits of losing.

Or take this year's worst team, the Bobcats, now run by Cho, who is well-regarded. What's plaguing the Bobcats is a history of mistakes, but also the reality that the front office -- Michael Jordan, Rod Higgins, Cho and company -- is not doing all it can to win right now. If there are cheap free agents they could add to make this team better, they have not added them. If there are better coaches available, now would not be the time to hire them.

Cho says he made something like that a condition of his joining the team. "They called me the day after I got let go by Portland," he recalls of the Bobcats. Cho had three years left on his Portland contract, and had that finest of luxuries -- he simply didn't have to work. "I had thought about taking some time off, or teaching at a high school," he told me on a recent episode of TrueHoop TV. "I thought about maybe coaching high school tennis, which I've wanted to do for a long time."

But he flew to Charlotte for a conversation that came down to a key moment, when Cho asked if the Bobcats really wanted to win. As in, did they want to win so badly that they'd be willing to follow in the footsteps of Cho's former employer, the Thunder, who won 20 games one season, and then 23 the next, in the process of amassing the core of their current team?

In other words, Cho was asking, were they willing to lose? "Are you willing," Cho remembers asking, "to take a step back to take two steps forward?"

Cho says the room answered, unanimously, "yes." A few months later, that team is 7-40.

Cho explains how the Thunder did it. When they had cap room, they didn't use it. Massive losing streaks helped too. The team's point guard of the future (Russell Westbrook) learned on the job while leading the league in turnovers.

There is no suggestion that any of the players or coaches didn't try their hardest. But the fact is the front office trotted out a young, cheap and, frankly, bad team for a good long time. Intentionally. During those same years they could have been, with a different strategy, far more competitive. But if they had done that, they'd never be leading the Western Conference right now, because they wouldn't have gotten the good players that came with the good picks that came from losing.

HoopIdea: Evidence-based incentives

I asked the NBA's Litvin what he makes of economists who insist the league would have more teams making better decisions if the best incentives were not handed to the bad teams.

His reply: Sports are not bound by the usual logic of economics.

"What you continue to characterize as giving prizes for coming in last, I continue to characterize as help for the teams that are the weakest," he explains. "If an economist has a hard time with that, it may be because this is a business that thrives on competitive balance and the goal is not to compete each other out of existence. That’s not how sports leagues operate. They operate on the basis of the best possible competition on the floor or the field."

Meanwhile, there is strong evidence some teams are chronically making bad decisions, the role model franchise is one that barely competed for years and the NBA's own economist pointed out during the lockout that the league has perhaps the worst competitive balance in sports (the opposite of what the league is claiming its system creates).

And the big prize driving all that is something handed out by the NBA.

In other words, what's happening is exactly what economists say would happen if you had the incentives all messed up. Could this really be the smartest way to do things?

文章名:Tanking is the tip of the iceberg

來源: http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/39318/tanking-is-the-tip-of-the-iceberg

也就是說, 本季又到了這個時刻, 比起搶季後賽位子的, 也有 Lotteryteams 在拼 NBA draft lottery 順位的. 只不過比賽輸的越多, 最後順位不見得愈前面, 有趣的是, 在這個體系裡, 有些本身並無意參與 Tanking-Game 的球隊也會受到波及

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Bjork本人就是音樂!

第二篇文章特別強調, Thunder 的 Rebuilding-Modell 可不是對任何球隊都適用的:

All hail the Thunder model!

It's hard to sell an ownership group and fans thirsty for a winner on that first part -- the part about enduring multiple abysmal seasons. But if you can guarantee that the second part -- the fun, up-and-coming team full of young, athletic and talented players -- people will happily buy in to losing.

The idea that has spread is to do what the Thunder did. Reboot. Strategically become bad to have the chance to become really, really good. The Bobcats are an example of just such a team -- it hired someone from the Thunder front office, Cho, and is selling its fan base on “the Thunder model.”

It’s easy. All you have to do is hit home runs on three top-five lottery picks (Durant, Westbrook, Harden), get an absolute steal in the middle of the first round (Ibaka) and hope all four players exceed the expectations of the basketball world, get along well and become active, well-loved members in their community. And it only takes six years.

Livin’ on a prayer

Here’s my list of top five picks that have become surefire franchise players (and the spot at which each was taken) in the last 10 years:

Yao Ming (2002, No. 1), LeBron James (2003, No. 1), Dwyane Wade (2003, No. 5), Dwight Howard (2004, No. 1), Deron Williams (2005, No. 3), Chris Paul (2005, No. 4), LaMarcus Aldridge (2006, No. 2), Kevin Durant (2007, No. 2), Derrick Rose (2008, No. 1), Russell Westbrook (2008, No. 4), Kevin Love (2008, No. 5), Blake Griffin (2009, No. 1) and Kyrie Irving (2011, No. 1).

That's 13 players in 10 drafts. If your team drafted in the top five, you had a one-in-four chance of snagging one of the future All-NBA candidates on the list above. That means most top-five draft choices cannot turn around their teams. Drafting in the top five, a team is more likely to end up with Raymond Felton, or if you’re lucky, Mike Conley, than Chris Paul. Still, teams are willing to make that long-shot bid, because any chance at all to get the next Dwight Howard is a chance worth tanking … err, taking.

What I’m suggesting is that the current lottery system does not help struggling teams nearly as much as one might think. It’s a collection of life preservers thrown a struggling group of franchises, but only one in four actually float. Thrashing about in the deep blue sea of futility to get that kind of odds of finding a great player hardly seems worth it.

Meanwhile, losing enough games to end up in the high lottery takes a serious toll on franchises and fan bases -- where the hope of finding a franchise savior in the lottery is sometimes the only thing that makes a team worth caring about. But relying on that kind of deus ex machina solution also breeds bad organizational habits and cultures of losing. Not every group of 21-year-old players, or any group of players, really, should be expected to go from starting a season 3-29 to finishing 52-30 the next.
The Thunder and Chicago Bulls are examples of teams that grabbed superb talents at the top of the draft but also made dozens of smart decisions up and down the organization -- like hiring Tom Thibodeau in Chicago and finding a creative, cap-friendly way to extend Nick Collison in Oklahoma City.

Getting lucky for three straight years in the draft is only a part of the Thunder story. The reality is teams that draft in the lottery for six straight years are more likely to resemble the Kings than become the Thunder. To a perpetually bad franchise pursuing "the Thunder model," my advice is the same as it would be for someone hunting a unicorn: good luck, and don't be upset if all you find are horses.

文章名: The Oklahoma City Unicorns

來源: http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/39546/the-oklahoma-city-unicorns

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Bjork本人就是音樂!

Jeff Van Gundy 建議的解決方式 ???

I would either have an inverse lottery, like the best record gets the most chances -- so trying becomes of paramount importance.

Or at the very least, everybody has an equal chance, so there is absolutely no benefit to trying to be bad.

Now, before you get all excited about how Van Gundy's solution would create a few super teams and leave everybody else in the cold, let me remind you:
In the real world, whether at school or work, the people who do the best get the most rewards, and that seems to generally work out OK.
Economists insist this would make not just a few teams but the whole league stronger.
Bad teams would still get good draft picks, not just all the good draft picks.
It would put a real premium on great long-term team management, which could be the best news ever for fans of bad teams.

文章名: Fix tanking: Jeff Van Gundy

來源: http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/39583/fix-tanking-jeff-van-gundy

我的看法是, JVG 是有意說, 該對 Draft Lottery 去改革, 使得在聯盟中好的管理階層能夠受惠, 而差勁的會得到處罰, JVG 似意指現況剛好相反

如果每隻球隊的機會是一樣的, 那麼 Tank 是否就對任何球隊而言沒有誘因? 我自己針對 JVG 的疑問反而是, 在 NBA 裡我們要如何認定, 一隻球隊是在坦克 (通常的共識是它故意在輸), 而一隻球隊其實真的只是差而己

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Bjork本人就是音樂!

一個嚴肅的問題: 坦克到底是什麼意思? 這是附帶順便對另一板問題的回答

我不認為 Tank 等於故意輸球, 因為球賽畢竟是生意, 沒有球隊會和買票進場的球迷過不去, 在我看來, 坦克是指你把大量的上場時間留給年輕, 沒有經驗的球員, 因為對它們而言, 這一季反正也沒有什麼目標可以再去追

籃球畢竟不是足球, 我認為在一個沒有降級制度的聯盟裡, 這樣的問題其實一直會在, 只在於球隊是否要不要重建

如果我們誇張的講, 如果會讓一隻爛隊的球迷真的是完全不在乎球隊戰績的原因在那:

(a) 籍由 Draft 或是 Lottery, 球隊可以補強

(b) 被派上場的發展聯盟級的球員, 在 Tank-Team 的每一場球也是付出 110% 的

拋開今年的情況不管, 來看看去年的 Hornets 或 Bobcats, 我相信其實他們的球迷並不在乎, 球隊最後是拿 17 勝或只有 12 勝

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Bjork本人就是音樂!

其實,就跟以前某本舊雜誌內容說得一樣:選秀,是弱隊先挑;自由球員市場,則是強隊有優先選擇權.

當初的內容,講得很機車(1996年的自由球員市場,大咖雲集,有Michael Jordan和Shaquille O`Neal,以及Mutombo等人): 您以為,Jordan和O`Neal會像史懷哲醫生深入黑暗非洲般,突然宣布他將加入灰狼(當年,26勝)和灰熊(當年,15勝)這種戰績''灰暗''得小球隊嗎?在這裡,我們明顯可以找到一種測試人類心裡正常與否的問題,問他,Jordan和O`Neal會不會到灰熊打球?如果有人說會,那我們該毫不考慮把他送到精神病院去.

當年的美國職籃聯盟雜誌,內容就是這麼有''深度''.

我的看法是:自從當年火箭連續兩年墊底,拿到狀元籤,''勾''走了NCAA當時的兩大中鋒Sampson和Olajuwon後,就改革過一次.後來,魔術連續兩年在''滾彩球''模式中,意外的都得到了第一順位選秀權(第二次,真的是奇蹟,魔術是當時未進季後賽球隊中,戰績最好的,僅有一顆彩球,但幸運的,還是''滾''了出來),第一次選了Shaquille O`Neal;第二次選了Webber(後來拿去交換Anfernee Hardaway和三個首輪選秀權),後來NBA再作改革,定為:一支球隊不能連兩年有第一順位選秀權.

我想,這對戰績最爛的球隊,可能不太公平,上次XXL雜誌就提到:自從1985年,選秀制度改革的第一年後,到現在,戰績最差球隊抽中第一順位選秀權,僅有3次.

本來,就不可能面面俱到,也有倒楣的球隊,得到第一順位選秀權,選到空有身材,球技不成熟的Olowokandi;心智不成熟和不願求進得Kwame Brown,還有,害怕他會受傷的Oden.只能說,有些事,真的是天意. 

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永遠的Jazz傳奇教練「教皇」Jerry Sloan.

https://ryan34n.pixnet.net/blog

這裡是第四篇文章, 對於取消 Lottery 的方案:

http://grantland.com/the-triangle/the-nbas-possible-solution-for-tanking-good-bye-to-the-lottery-hello-to-the-wheel/

文章中的想法是很有趣的, 但是我認為有個問題在, 你要怎樣能夠事先預知, 你那一年有那個順位的 Pick?

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Bjork本人就是音樂!

這方面的討論與文章，我認為大多搞錯了方向。

NBA聯盟若要改選秀制度，著眼點絕對不在什麼公平性或平衡性之類的。而是在於把選秀搞成一場年度盛會，能與NFL選秀相抗衡。

所以只要是能引起話題的新規則，越複雜愈好，那些我們在FB玩的把戲，甚至大富翁裡面的卡片都可以拿來玩。競標制、陷阱卡、強制徵收、強制三選一... 

Nothing is true, everything is permitted. 

Case of JAZZ:

1. 季末放走Al Jefferson跟Millsap兩位當打的準明星球員,先發控衛Mo Williams

2. 空出的薪資空間補進的是:從勇士硬吃下Richard Jefferson,Rush,Biedrins這三位的到期合約,代價是2014跟2017勇士未保護首輪+2016跟2017勇士二輪+金塊2018二輪等5個選秀權跟現金

也就是說爵士用三位主力球員換三個到期合約球員+5個選秀權...新人會盡量練,戰績就請球迷忍耐一年=>要球迷有tank的心理準備

GM的重大失誤:Mo,Tinsley,Watson等三位控衛都放走,只底薪補一位Lucas 3,PG全押在新人Burke上,但Burke受傷,在Burke能上場先發前已經是1勝14負,不想要tank都難了

3. 留著Ty...就算他跟球員都很work hard,留著他就等於tanking

爵士除了開季那1勝14負外,其實打得並不難看,季中也沒再做減損戰力的交易;但其實那5個選秀權拿出來,已經可以換到不少戰力,而GM完全不作為=>等於tanking

(a) 籍由 Draft 或是 Lottery, 球隊可以補強

(b) 被派上場的發展聯盟級的球員, 在 Tank-Team 的每一場球也是付出 110% 的

以這兩點來說爵士是及格的

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到底坦克對於一隻球隊是否值得, 我認為可以回顧金塊過去 15-20 年的歷史, 七六人過去十幾年可能還不大有說服力 (大概類似), 然後結論可能還是見仁見智

我的映像, 大概自 20 世紀 90 年代末起到 21 世紀初這段期間, 球隊一直在坦, 希望能夠藉此得到隊上的 Franchise-Player, 但是也直到 2003, 他們終於非常幸運的得到 Melo, 因為他們當時 GM 原先的計劃是在 Draft 2003 以第三籤拿到 Darko 的, 要不是 Pistons 在 2nd 把他選走的話

大家接下來都知道, 球隊圍繞著 Melo 組隊, 花下大錢 (Kenyon Martin), 換來一名 Co-Star (Iverson) 以及簽約名教練 (Karl), 但是就算這一切努力, 他們在 Melo 時期總是 PO 第一輪止步, 除了 Billups 的到來有一次例外, 這算不算是成功也是見仁見智, 一方面球隊是中上一輪遊, 另外一方面至少球隊在競爭激烈的西區也進入了 PO, 這也不是每一隻球隊能夠辦到的

在 Melo-Trade 之後, 球隊走沒有明星球員的 Franchise, 但是成果和以前有 Melo 在時似乎也沒有兩樣: 1st-Round-Exit vs OKC, 1st-Round-Exit vs Lakers 然後 GS....

去年夏天, 球隊應該是終結了這段歷史: Iguodala 離開, Gallo 的受傷, 連 Karl 也離開, 球隊正式解體, 又開始一段新坦克紀元, 不過差別是, 球隊現在的陣容充斥著中上的球員, Cap-Space 也花光, 那這樣另外一個 1st-Round-Exit .....

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Bjork本人就是音樂!

今天ESPN採訪Adam Silver這篇講得不錯, Commish: Tanking doesn't exist

沒有Tanking, 只有Rebuilding

訂調Rebuilding是選秀規則內可以理解的球隊戰略, Tanking是打放水球, NBA沒有球員跟教練希望輸球, 一旦發現,他會採取行動

http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/10597248/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-says-tanking-exist

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The Pistons are a long way from being champions. They’re currently tumbling further from the playoff race and most discussion centers on the prospect of their keeping their top-eight protected lottery pick, which won’t be decided until late May.

Gores, and his partners at Platinum Equity, shot down the idea of tanking the rest of the season to preserve the draft pick, although the Pistons have won just three games, suggesting they needn’t try to tank to lose games.

“Well first of all I’m not giving up. No way. It’s not possible,” Gores said. “We have to keep building. We have great building blocks in our young guys. Look, we have a lot to do. There’s no way that anything great happens without tough times. That’s the way it goes. So I’m comfortable.”


來源: http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20140322/SPORTS0102/303220074#ixzz2wohLKkgW

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Bjork本人就是音樂!

還有一篇有趣的文章:

http://www.sbnation.com/2014/3/21/5532810/nba-draft-lottery-tanking-reform?utm_source=sbnation&utm_medium=nextclicks&utm_campaign=articlebottom

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Bjork本人就是音樂!

我推測今年的樂透選秀順位可能會比較接近 1999 年的那次 (資料來自 realgm):

http://basketball.realgm.com/nba/draft/lottery_results/1999

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Bjork本人就是音樂!